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国际金融计算题(含答案)
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金融计算题求解。1、假定某日外汇市场即期汇率如下：纽约外汇市场：￡1＝$1.0伦敦外汇市场：￡1＝$1.0试用100万英镑套汇并计算套汇毛利润。2、假定某时期，美国金融市场上六个月期存贷款利率分别为5%、5.5%，而英国同期存贷款利率分别为2.5%、3%，外汇行市如下：即期汇率：￡1=＄1.0，六个月远期汇率为：￡1=＄1.0，若无自有资金，能否套利？用计算说明。
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明显可以看到以美元计价的话，遵循低买高卖的原则，在伦敦卖出100万英镑，得到1502000美元，在纽约买入100万英镑，支出1501000美元， 套利1000美元。可以看到，美国的利率比英国高，则应该从英国借钱，到美国去投资。假设有10000英镑，则现在换成美元为14220美元，在美国投资六个月，收益为14220*（1+5%/2)=14575.5美元，则换成英镑为.43=英镑，而当初借的10000英镑，六个月后应该还10000*（1+3%/2)=10150英镑 150=42.657 即可以套利42.757英镑，说明可以套利。
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资产负债表:反映公司在某一特定日期财务状况的会计报表。资产:过去的交易、事项形成并由企业拥有或者控制的资源,该资源预期会给公司带来经济利益.负债:过去的交易、事项形成的现时义务,履行该义务预期会导致经济利益流出公司。利润表:反映公司在一定期间经营成果实现情况的报表现金流量表:反映公司在一定期间内现金流入和现金流出情况的报表,它反映的是一定会计期间内的数据,属于动态的年度报表.金融资产:在金融市场上资金融通所产生的信用凭证和投资证券。年金:在一定时期内,每间隔相同时间支付或收入相等金额的款项。股利是股息和红利的总称,它由公司董事会宣布从公司的净利润中分配给股东,作为股东对公司投资的报酬。剩余股利政策将公司的盈余首先用于良好的投资项目,然后将剩余的盈余作为股利进行分配。经营租赁:由出租人将自己的设备或用品反复出租,直到该设备报废为止。融资租赁:因承租人需要长期使用某种资产,但又没有足够的资金自行购买,由出租人出资购买该项资产,然后出租给承租人的一种租赁方式商业信用:一种在商品交易中,公司之间由于延期付款或预收货款所形成的借贷关系资本成本:用百分数表示的、公司取得并使用资本所应负担的成本,即资本是不能无偿使用的财务风险:公司资本结构不同而影响公司支付本息的能力所产生的风险。财务杠杆:公司在作出资本结构决策时对债务筹资的利用程度。回收期法:以收回原是投资所需时间作为评判投资方案。净现值:投资方案未来现金净流入量的现值与投资额的现值之间的差额内含报酬率:一个投资方案的内在报酬率,它是在未来现金净流入量的现值正好等于投资额的现值的假设下所求出的贴现信用条件公司给予客户购货的付款条件,主要包括信用期限、折扣率和折扣期限
经济批量一定时期储存成本和订货成本总和最低的采购批量。
为什么以股东财富最大化作为公司理财目标答:采用股东财富最大化作为公司理财目标,考虑到了货币时间价值和风险价值,也体现了对公司资产保值增值的要求,有利于克服公司经营上的短期行为,促进公司理财当局从长远战略角度进行财务决策,不断增加公司财富。因而这一目标模式对现代公司来讲,应是符合理论与实践需要的。公司理财的具体内容是什么答:①筹资决策②投资决策③股利分配决策简述资产的含义及其特征。答:资产是指过去的交易、事项形成并由企业拥有或者控制的资源,该资源预期会给公司带来经济利益。特征:①资产的实质是经济资源,这些资源能为公司带来未来的经济利益②资产必须为公司所拥有或控制③资产必须能以货币计量④资产可以是有形的,也可以是无形的公司的税后利润应如何分配?答:①被没收的财物损失,支付各种税收的滞纳金和罚款②弥补公司以前年度亏损③提出法定盈余公积金④提取公益金⑤向投资者分配利润简述金融资产的含义及其属性。答:金融资产是指在金融市场上资金融通所产生的信用凭证和投资证券。属性:①流动性②风险性③收益性股票有哪些特点?答:①股票表示的是对公司的所有权②股票持有者不能向公司索还本金③股票不能获得稳定的收益④股票是可以转让的⑤股票价格具有波动性普通股筹资有何优缺点?答:优点:①普通股股本是公司的永久股本,不需要偿还,在公司存续期内可以自由安排使用,是公司最稳定的资本来源,除非公司破产清算时才予以偿还。②普通股筹资方式可以使公司不必负担固定的利息费用③采取普通股筹资所冒风险小④普通股筹资方式容易吸收社会资本⑤普通股构成支付公司债务的基础,发行较多的普通股,意味着公司对债权人提供了较大程度的保护,能有效地增强公司借款能力与贷款信用。缺点:①筹措普通股时发生的费用高②普通股的增加发行往往会使公司原有股东的参与权掺水公司比较常用的股利政策有哪些?剩余股利政策、固定股利额政策、固定股利支付率政策、低正常股利价额外股利政策在实际工作中为什么许多公司愿意采取固定股利额政策?答:①股利支付数额的波动将会导致股票价格的波动,应因此提高公司普通股股本的成本②稳定的股利向市场传递着公司正常运营的信息,有利于树立公司良好的形象,稳定股票的价格③利用股利来支付当期消费的股东,,通常希望能依靠固定的股利收入来维持其日常生活指出。④为维持稳定的股利水平,会采取延缓某些投资计划,将实际资本结构脱离目标资本结构或出售普通股以筹措资金等措施。发行债券筹资有哪些优缺点?答:优点:①借款比较便利②筹资成本相对较低③具有较大的灵活性④可以发挥财务杠杆的作用缺点:①财务风险较高②限制条款较多③筹资数额有限融资租赁有哪些特点答:①租赁期长,租期一般为租赁资产预计使用年限的一半以上②租赁合同比较稳定,在合同有效期内双方均无权单方面撤销合同③出租人不承担租赁资产的维修等服务,有关租赁资产的维修、保险、管理等均由承租人负责④租赁期满,对租赁资产的处理往往有这样几种办法:将设备作价转让给承租人;由出租人收回;延长租期续租什么是财务风险?公司财务风险具体表现在哪些方面?答:财务风险主要指公司资本结构不同而影响公司支付本息的能力所产生的风险。表现:①负债程度②负债偿还顺序③现金流量脱节什么是最优资本结构?其判断标准是什么?答:最优资本结构是指公司在一定时期内,使其加权平均资本成本最低、公司价值最大时的资本结构。标准:①有利于最大限度地增加股东财富,使公司价值最大化②使公司加权平均资本成本达到最低,这是一条主要标准③保持资本的流动性,使公司的资本结构具有一定的弹性回收期法有什么优缺点?答:优点:①投资方案的回收期可以作为衡量备选方案风险程度的指标②回收期法可以衡量出投资方案的变现能力,即投资的回收速度③方法简便,决策的工作成本较低。缺点:①回收期法忽视了投资方案的获利能力②回收期法另一个主要缺点是没有考虑货币的时间价值因素简述公司现金日常控制的主要方法答:①加速收款速度②延缓付款速度③巧妙运用现金浮游量④设法使现金流入与流出同步简述信用评估的内容。答:①品质②能力③资本④担保⑤外部环境
1、根据ABC公司20××年度的简易资产负债表计算资产负债率、流动比率、速动比率和现金比率。
简易资产负债表(答案:41%、123.92%、36.99%、32.44%)
编制单位:ABC公司时间:20××年12月31日单位:元
负债及所有者权益
一、流动资产
一、流动负债
流动负债合计
二、长期负债
长期负债合计
流动资产合计
二、固定资产
固定资产合计
三、无形资产
三、所有者权益
无形资产合计
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下载次数：某公司发行一种债券，每年支付利息为100元，债券面值为1 000元，市场利率为8%，到期年限为5年求发行价格
网友提问：某公司发行一种债券，每年支付利息为100元，债券面值为1 000元，市场利率为8%，到期年限为5年求发行价格某公司发行一种债券，每年支付利息为100元，债券面值为1 000元，市场利率为8%，到期年限为5年求发行价格专家回答：你好，我是学投资理财的，财务管理刚好有教，现在我给您解答一下。因为每年支付利息为100，所以债券的票面利率是10%，得出票面利率大于市场利率，因此此债券是溢价发行。计算公式：发行价格=R*r*（P/A，i，n）+R*（P/F，i，n）其中R为债券面值，r为票面利率，i为市场利率，n为5（期数），计算此式需查看年金现值系数表与复利现值系数表，计算得出：发行价=..+680.6=1079.87发行价为1079.87元。以后您还有金融证券的问题，我们还可以探讨下哦~~
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1　为什么针对合约损失需要有遥远性的局限？　　在谈到损失的遥远性（remoteness of damages），最重要的一个方面就是针对一些合理预见（reasonably foreseeable或within reasonable contemplation）与不可预见的损失。这一个大原则适用在侵权与合约，虽然在合约方面，有说法是The “Achilleas”（2007）1 Lloyd’s Rep.19带来了一些改变，变了不是预见与否，而是双方订约时假设去接受的责任（assumption of responsibility），这变成是双方所订的合约中去明示或默示看有否对某一种类型的损失有去考虑到，并且违约方是否愿意去承担后果。换言之，针对受害方可以在正常情况下向违约方索赔或取回的损失类别是有所收紧的。　　这里要去区分损失，并不让受害方可以向违约方全部取回的合理性是如果要违约方承担所有的损失，不论是否可以预见（甚至在双方谈判合约的时候，如果把这种损失提出来要求违约方去承担，将要承担风险的一方会有可能拒绝订约），是太苛刻的，甚至是不公平的。这里可以去举几个日常与假设的例子，第一个是笔者在儿子小时候用来讲道理时候所用的例子，这就是一个乘客与一个出租车司机（或公司）约好第二天清早接他去机场。但第二天清早由于出租车司机睡过头爽约，原告因此误了班机，丧失了一宗大生意达1千万美元。那么司机是否要去赔偿这一千万美元呢？旁观的第三者马上会感到，要该司机赔这么大一笔钱有不妥、不公平之处。但能去说得出什么法理上站的住脚的抗辩吗？第一个想的到的就是该乘客在过了约定时间之后没有看到出租车，为什么不去另外找一辆出租车去机场？或是，早一班飞机赶不上就赶下一班飞机？这是涉及减少损失（mitigation）方面，本书另章会谈。但在这里就可以去假设没有这一减损的合理机会，因为乘客住的地方很荒僻，清早根本无法找到其他的出租车。另外，飞机去的目的地是一个班机不多的地方，错过了清早这一班飞机就要等多几天才有班机，这一笔大生意就错过了。第二个想到的就是出租车司机不知道乘客原来有这么重要的事情要办，如果乘客早告诉他这一事实，他就会有不同做法。例如在早一天的晚上就在乘客的家门外等待，就绝对不会爽约。甚至，如果这是一个比较正规的租车合约，出租车司机会去加上条文限制违约下的赔偿责任或是去提高租车费。如果这样就公道一点的话就假设在这个例子内，乘客在订车的时候的确是有电话里提到接他去机场非常重要因为他赶着去签一个重要的合约，并承诺会给出租车司机多一点小费。这一来，假设乘客能够证明这些事实，是否足够妥善与公平要出租车司机去承担这1千万美元的损失呢？会否，该乘客还要更清楚说明如果出租车司机毁约的后果将会是面对1千万美元的索赔，并说明多一点小费是多少钱（如果没有说明小费多少或是只承诺给10元的区区小数，就会与承诺1万美元的小费，显然是有所不同），然后让出租车司机值不值得冒这个险来接这个生意？看来，法律这一刀切在什么地方并不是一件容易的事情。　　香港高院Reyes大法官在2008年2月给香港大学的发言《Certainty in Contractual Damages Assessment – On Two Suggested Alternatives to the Rule in Hadley v. Baxendale》中也举到一个例子可以在这里一提，这是从英国一首童谣引出来的：　　“For want of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost, for want of a horse the rider was lost, for want of a rider the battle was lost, for want of a battle the kingdom was lost, and all for the want of a horseshoe nail.”。　　假设在国王和铁匠之间有一个以100美元来提供马蹄钉的合约，在合约的谈判过程中，国王提到这个钉子是用在他的马匹上，而他即将骑这匹马去参加一场战役。国王声称这个钉子必须拥有最顶级的质量否则他就会战败亡国。而铁匠以为国王只是说笑而没有提出任何条文去免除交付时钉子有缺陷的责任，也没有去要求更高的报酬。结果，铁匠交付出的钉子质量上有缺陷，最终导致国王在战役中因为马失前蹄战败。在这种情况下，可不可以说铁匠要为国王战败与亡国的后果负责呢？换句话说，在与国王的谈判过程中，铁匠是不是要为了区区100美元的收入承担国王战败与亡国的责任呢？　　这个例子是极端的，但它引起了人的疑问：合理的可预见性或者其他类似的测试可否作为限制合约赔偿的原则呢？这会否对订约双方更加公平？&2　Hadley v. Baxendale先例的损失规定　　显然，对于这种无法合理估计到的后果是应该有一个地方来一刀切断。这里就要介绍一个英国最著名的、在诉讼中被引用最多的一个先例Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex. 341，它就损失合理预见性问题确立了一套基本的理论，称为其后这方面判例的一个总体指南。该案情是：原告的工厂因蒸汽机曲轴断裂造成停产，原告急忙委托被告船东将断轴运送给某地的厂家供其依样再做一根新的。结果被告违约（海上运输合约）延迟了交付，造成新轴比原计划晚了好几天才交到原告厂里。为此，原告向被告索赔若没有这几天延迟工厂本可早点复工而挣取到的生产利润。法院判定：延迟交送断轴给制造厂家造成原告工厂停产的损失是被告无法合理预见的，被告订约当时的全部认识就是为原告工厂这一条断轴运输，他并不知道原告没有任何备用轴可供应急，更不知道延误会带来停产。结果原告败诉。道理其实也很简单，虽然船东确实是违约延迟了交货，比如是船舶不合理绕航或不适航等，但所运的断轴仅仅是一个零件。以通常合理的眼光看，原告工厂晚了拿到新的零件损失了什么呢？船东哪里晓得原告没有备用的应急，以致弄到整个工厂停产这么严重。如果所有损失都给索赔回来，工厂停产，那可不得了啊。产值利润没了，工人没公开，收入没了，说不定家计都成了问题。这些都要船东来赔？船东肯定跳起来了，说：“你怎么不早讲这些后果啊！如果你订约当时就告诉我，这个断轴一定要某月某日前运抵，务必准时，否则整个工厂就开不了工，要倒闭，那我肯定不运了。即使运的话，我也会收很高的运费，因为责任太大了嘛！”这是一个很早的案子了，如果是现在的案子，船东可能还会说：“你要早讲明后果，运费贵了一点我也会运，不过就不是现在这个运法了。一旦半途船遇到什么麻烦，可能造成延迟的话，我就会马上设法把断轴转到岸上交飞机空运到目的地，以确保准时。而现在你事后才告诉我损失这么多，这怎么行呢？”　　这个案子判下来后，有关违约损害赔偿的判定就有了一个按违约方能否合理预见作为标准把损失分为两种类别的做法，或称为两条规则。一种是“一般损失”（ordinary damages），或毁约会造成的自然与一般性后果，违约方要赔；另一种是“特别损失”（special damages），或称非一般后果，违约方不用赔，除非订约当时或之前受害方已将特别后果告诉了违约方。其中，法院的判决如下：　　“We think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this: where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e. accordingly to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, would only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the
and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them. Now the above principles are those by which we think the jury ought to be guided in estimating the damages arising out of any breach of contract.”　　对这一个重要先例的理解，可去节录Goff大法官在The “Pegase” (1981) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 175的有关判词：　　“This statement of principle was at one time widely understood to embrace two “rules”, the first rule being concerned with the recovery of damages arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, and the second rule being concerned with recovery of damages within the contemplation of the parties at the time when the contract was made.& Furthermore, the application of the second rule was understood to be dependant upon knowledge of special circumstances which had not merely been communicated by the plaintiff to the defendant at or before the time when the contract was made (a requirement which is consistent with one reading of the succeeding passage in Baron Alderson’s judgment), but had been so communicated that the defendant, by entering into the contract, assented expressly or impliedly to assuming the risk of loss flowing from such special circumstances.”　　接下去就有不少先例根据Hadley v. Baxendale的损失规定去作出判决，看看损失类别到底是属于一般损失或特别损失。其中，被判是特别损失的类别，在订约时受害方没有预先作出通知，是不能去索赔的，包括有：针对承运人，分销合约的利润损失不能去索赔的先例有：Wilson v. The Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway (1861) 9 CB (NS) 632；O’ Hanlan v. The Great Western Railway (1865) 12 LT 490；Great Western Railway Co. v. Redmayne (1866) LR 1 CP 329；Horne v. Midland Railway (1873) LR 8 CP 131；The “Arpad” (1934) 49 Lloyd’s Rep 313；Heskell v. Continental Express Ltd. (1950) 83 Lloyd’s Rep 438。针对货物的生产损失或利润不能去索赔的先例有：Hadley v. Baxendale；Gee v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway (1860) 6 H&N 211；British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP 499。看来这些案件主要是针对货物买卖与货物运输，特别是海上运输，这也是当年最主要的商业活动。　　但在Hadley v. Baxendale之后，普通法还是有进一步的发展。第一方面是通过Victoria Laundry v. Newman Industries (1949) 2 K.B. 528与The “Heron II ” (1967) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 457这两个贵族院先例去进一步给了解读。其中在Victoria Laundry就带来了说法就是双方在订立合约的时候，如果将来发生违约/毁约，哪些损失种类是可以去推定双方知情（imputed knowledge）。在The “Heron II ”，认为更好的测试办法是去看将来发生违约/毁约，哪些损失是双方在订约时是可以料想得到的（within contemplation）且并非是不可能（not unlikely）会产生，或者很可能（serious possibility）会发生，但不需要达到极有可能（probable）的程度。有说法是“possible”是有50%以下的可能性，而“probable”则有高达90%的可能性。这变了每次去考虑损失的遥远性，只需要根据这一条规定，而在也不需要Hadley v. Baxendale的两条损失规定。　　在普通法下另一方面的发展，会是在扩大被视为是双方（特别是将来的违约方）应该是可以合理料想得到的损失类别。例如是在Victoria Laundry，违约方是一家工程公司，也被视为是可以料想得到锅炉的延迟交付会导致洗衣馆的正常利润的损失。另在The “Heron II”，违约方船东被视为是知道货物目的地港巴斯拉是有一个市场，船舶延误会带来市场下跌的可能性。可以说随着通讯发达与一般人知识面的不断扩大，所以估计去认定在订约时双方应该可以合理料想得到的事情包括违约会造成什么损失也不断放宽。　　以下我们将上述的简单介绍去进一步地解释。
3　Victoria Laundry先例的进一步解读　　这一个Hadley v. Baxendale的损失规定在先例Victoria Laundry v. Newman Industries (1949) 2 K.B. 528的上诉庭有了进一步的解读。案情涉及了原告洗衣馆向被告工程公司订购了一个锅炉，被告迟交货达5个月之久，原告诉称被告若按期交货，原告除了因使用锅炉可赚取正常利润之外，还应可获得并完成几项来自政府方面的合约，挣取极高额的利润，因此，被告要赔偿所有这些盈利损失。法庭判定被告在订约前已知晓原告是从事洗衣、印染行业，而且该锅炉是原告急待投入使用以扩大业务量的。因此对原告本可赚取的正常利润的丧失，被告必须赔偿，因这是他在订约当时可以合理预见的一般损失。至于那几份获利奇高合约的盈利损失，则被告无须负责。因为在被告没有特别知会的情况下，被告不可能预见到原告会有这么值钱的几份合约在手。这些合约本可带来的异常利润的丧失客观上对被告来说，是遥不可及的特别损失。　　从这个判例，我们可以再次看到，要判定某种损失可否合理预见与是否特别，受害方（被违约方）能否获赔，关键就是要看订约时违约方能否合理预见到（reasonably foreseeable）他一旦违约，就很有可能会导致某种类损失。如果能预见到，那么这种损失就是一般损失，违约方必须赔偿，反之则是不可合理预见的特别损失，违约方无须负责。　　Victoria Laundry先例实是对Hadley v. Baxendale的两条损失规定加以分析，然后去列出著名的六项大原则，如下（英文）：　　（1） It is well settled that the governing purpose of damages is to put the party whose rights have been violated in the same position, so far as money can do so, as if his rights had been observed: Sally Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co.(1911) A. C. 301. This purpose, if relentlessly, pursued, would provide him with a complete indemnity for all lose de facto resulting from a particular breach, however improbable, however unpredictable. This, in contract at least, is recognized as too harsh a rule. Hence,（这里指出受害方如果可以向违约方索赔全部损失，包括一些极不可能与估计不到的损失，会带来很苛刻的后果。） 　　（2） In cases of breach of contract the aggrieved party is only entitled to recover such part of the loss actually resulting as was at the time of the contract reasonably foreseeable as liable to result from the breach.（如果违约，受害方只能去索赔与取回在订约时可以合理预见的由于违约带来的损失部分）　　（3） What was at that time reasonably so foreseeable depends on the knowledge then possessed by the parties or, at all events, by the party who later commits the breach. （什么是在订约时可以合理预见，是要根据订约双方当时应该知道的。这表示对合理预见性的测试，还要看后来变为是违约方在订约时合理应该对什么知情。例如在Hadley v. Baxendale先例，船东不是搞工厂，所以通常不知道工厂是否有该轴的备件，也不会知道工厂会因为缺少这个轴而导致停产。）　　（4） For this purpose, knowledge “possessed” one imputed, the other actual. Everyone, as a reasonable person, is taken to know the “ordinary course of things” and consequently what loss is liable to result from a breach of contract in that ordinary course. This is the subject matter of the “first rule” in Hadley v. Baxendale…But to this knowledge which a contract–breaker is assumed to possess whether possesses it or not, there may have to be added in a particular case knowledge which he actually possesses, of special circumstances outside the “ordinary course of things” of such a kind that a breach in those special circumstances would be liable to cause more loss. Such a case attracts the operation of the “second rule” so as to make additional loss also recoverable.（违约方在订约时应该知情的情况分为两种，第一种是推定知情，第二种是真正知情。第一种是去假设一般人士或在该合约有关行业的人士都应该知道，这是轮不到违约方去抗辩说他实际上是不知道，因为念书少或是愚蠢、无知不是抗辩理由。第二种真正知情是违约方真正知道的，这通常是由受害方去通知。去找出违约方是否真正知道，是一个事实的认定。这真正知情与推定知情不一样的地方就是前者不是一般人士或在该合约有关行业的人士应该知道。这真正知情就会导致适用Hadley v. Baxendale的第二条规则，也就是让受害方可去索赔特别损失的额外损失。）　　（5） In order to make the contract–breaker liable under either rule it is not necessary that he should actually have asked himself what loss is liable to result from a breach. As has often been pointed out, parties at the time of contracting contemplate not the breach of the contract, but its performance. It suffices that, if he had considered the question, he would as a reasonable man have concluded that the loss in question was liable to result…（去找出违约方是否对一般损失或特别损失负责，是不必去考虑他到底是否知道违约会带来什么损失。这是因为在订约时，双方只会考虑到如何履行与赚钱，不会去想违约/毁约带来的后果。但只要是去假设在订约时，如果被问及，违约方作为一个合理的人士应该料想到某些损失会有可能或很可能产生就已经足够了。）　　（6） Nor, finally, to make a particular loss recoverable, need it be proved that upon a given state of knowledge the defendant could, as a reasonable man, foresee that a breach must necessarily result in that loss. It is enough if he could foresee it was likely so to result. It is indeed enough, …if the loss (or some factor without which it would not have occurred) is a “serious possibility” or a “real danger”. For short, we have used the word “liable” to result. Possibly the colloquialism ‘on the cards’ indicates the shade of meaning with some approach to accuracy. （只要能够证明违约方在订约时能够预见到某种损失有可能或很有可能会发生，即要对损失负责，而不必要预见到这种损失一定会发生。）　　3.1& 什么是推定知情（imputed knowledge）　　现在去进一步解释什么是推定知情，在Hadley v. Baxendale先例中，违约方的推定知情是要对第一种的一般损失负责。去认定违约方在订约时什么是应该知道或不知道是要根据每个案件的事实去分析。但总的来说，是根据三个因素去作出认定。第一个是订约双方（特别是原告受害方的）的行业与专业。所以，有不少先例判是业务的损失或者转售利润的损失类别，针对有关货物的卖方与运载该货物的承运人是有不同的判法。显然，前者卖方是行业内的人士，他应该知道得更多。这在The “Heron II ” (1967) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 457先例中，Upjohn勋爵也说：“a carrier of goods…is not carrying on the same trade as the consignor of goods and his knowledge of the practices and exigencies of the other’s trade may be limited and less than between buyer and seller of goods who probably know far more about one another’s business.”　　另一个涉及了土地/房子买卖的先例是Diamond v. Compbell-Jones (1961) Ch 22，案情涉及了买方向毁约的卖方索赔损失，损失是包括了他预期可以赚取的利润，因为他向卖方买的位于伦敦的房子是计划去把它们重新装修然后作为住宅与办公楼之用。Buckley大法官只判毁约方去赔偿房子的市场价格减去合约价格的差价，认为毁约方通常不会知道受害方的业务与有什么打算，除非订约前已被通知。他是这样说：　　“I cannot believe that Lord Wright，in … the Monarch Steamship Co v. A/B Karlshamns Oljefabriker (1940) 82 Lloyd’s Rep.137 meant that anyone entering into a contract must be treated as having constructive notice of the nature of the other party’s business, or of its probable bearing on the loss which that other party might suffer in consequence of a breach of contract. In some cases the nature or the subject-matter of a contract or of its terms may be such as to make it clear that one of the parties is entering into the contract for the purpose of a particular business, and the circumstances may be such that the court will infer that the other party must have appreciated that this was so. It seems to me, however, that this can rarely be the case where the contract is for the sale of land. The vendor of a ship equipped for use as a butcher’s shop would not, in my judgment, be justified by that circumstance alone in assuming, and ought not to be treated as knowing, that the purchaser would intend to use it for the business of a butcher rather than that of a baker or candlestick-maker, at any rate in the absence of covenants or other forms of restriction confining its use to butcher’s business. Special circumstances are necessary to justify imputing to a vendor of land a knowledge that the purchaser intends to use it in any particular manner.”　　有说法是一个简单的行业可以去推断违约方有更多的知情，而一个复杂的行业就会是违约方不会有太多的知情。这是Juancey勋爵在The “Heron II”先例说的：　　“It must always be a question of circumstances what one contracting party is presumed to know about the business activities of the other.& No doubt the simpler the activity of the one, the more readily can it be inferred that the other would have reasonable knowledge thereof.& However, when the activity of A involves complicated construction or manufacturing techniques, I see no reason why B who supplies a commodity which A intends to use in the course of those technique should be assumed, merely because of the order for the commodity, to be award of the details of all the techniques undertaken by A and the effect thereupon of any failure of or deficiency in that commodity.& Even if the Lord Ordinary had made a positive finding that continuous pouring was a required part of industrial practice it would not follow that in the absence of any other evidence suppliers of electricity…should have been award of that practice.”　　另有可能根据有关货物能去推定违约方有更多或更少的知情，其中在涉及了整批货物例如是一台完整的机器，相比只是一些零件，就可以作出不同程度的推定（例如针对利润损失）。这是Asquith大法官在Victoria Laundry先例中所说：“Significance in so far as it bears on the capacity of the supplier to foresee the consequence of non-delivery.”　　针对市场的涨跌会造成的损失，这通常被视为是双方在订约时可以去推定知情。Parker大法官在Interoffice Telephones v. Freeman (1958) 1 QB 190说：　　“Whether it be a hiring agreement or a contract for the sale of goods, where the purchaser has failed to take delivery, the defaulting party must contemplate that damages will vary according to the state of the market, including questions of supply and demand.”　　3.2& 什么是真正知情（actual knowledge） 　　3.2.1　订约后才作出通知有关特别情况　　如果要违约方承担某一种类别的特别损失，就必须认定他在订约的时候有真正的知情。如果在订约后才有真正的知情，例如受害方向违约方在违约之前作出通知，这是不管用的。虽然，曾经有一个古老的先例名为Gee v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway (1860) 6 H&N 211说受害方可以对违约方在违约之前声明：“If you, after that notice, persist in breaking the contract, I shall claim the damages which will result from the breach.”，就会导致违约方要去承担特别损失。但这一个说法是错误，这方面请看《McGregor on Damages》17版6-174段。笔者看来，这显然是正确的，否则潜在的受害方可以留待合约一订立就马上通知对方有关一切违约会产生的特别损失，严重的程度是对方（潜在的违约方）从来没想过去接受的。但由于合约已经订立，对方也没有退出或改变合约（例如去加上责任限制条文）的余地，这岂非是开玩笑。　　3.2.2　订约前作出通知有关特别情况怎样才算是足够　　更复杂的情况是如果受害方在订约时把有关的特别情况告诉违约方，并且是足够去保障将来对特别损失的索赔。例如买方告诉卖方他这票货已经转卖，这是否是足够去增加卖方的赔偿责任？看来，这么简单的通知不像有什么作用，在国际买卖中，不少的商品或货物都会在海上运输期间转卖，不必通知也可以推定知情。这个问题在Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex. 341先例之后的好几个先例都有涉及，第一个是British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP 499，Willes大法官说光是知道有关的特别情况并不足够，而是要受害方在订约的时候可以合理相信违约方是接受了这一个特别情况下订约的。毕竟，知情可以是来自第三人的通知，但这并不足够。知情必须是受害方与违约方之间合约的一部分，显示了违约方愿意接受这一个赔偿责任。Willes大法官是这样说：“The mere fact of knowledge cannot increase the liability. The knowledge must be brought home to the party sought to be charged, under such circumstances that he must know that the person he contracts with reasonably believes that he accepts the contract with the special condition attached to it … Knowledge on the part of the carrier is only important if it forms part of the contract. It may be that the knowledge is acquired casually from a stranger, the person to whom the goods belong not knowing or caring whether he had such knowledge or not…”　　但接下去在The “Heron II ” (1967) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 457，Upjohn勋爵明确表示不同意，认为双方在知道一些特别情况下去订立合约，就可以合理假设为双方有料想到违约/毁约会带来的后果，不需要再去以合约条文明示或默示去同意这种特别情况说明。Upjohn勋爵说：“If parties enter into the contract with knowledge of some special circumstances, and it is reasonable to infer a particular loss as a result of those circumstances that is something which both must contemplate as a result of a breach. It is quite unnecessary that it should be a term of the contract.”　　这方面的发展等于是对特别损失所需要的通知有所放宽，这可以去节录Goff大法官在The “Pagase” (1981) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 175所讲的如下：“The second development (这是指Hadley v. Baxendale之后针对这一方面的法律调整) has been a loosening of the rule, stated in earlier cases (of which British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship is a typical example) that knowledge by the defendant of special circumstances is only relevant if so communicated to him (这是指违约方) that he, by entering into the contract, assented expressly or impliedly to assume the risk of loss flowing from such special circumstances. Indeed, in The ‘Heron II’, Lord Upjohn expressly dissented from the proposition that liability for damages resulting from special circumstances must be made a term of the contract. … In the light of the decided cases, the test appears to be: have the facts in question come to the defendant’s knowledge in such circumstances that a reasonable person in the shoes of the defendant would, if he had considered the matter at the time of making the contract, have contemplated that, in the event of a breach by him, such facts were to be taken into account when considering of his responsibility for loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of such breach. The answer to that question may vary from case to case, taking into consideration matters as, for example, the nature of the facts in question and how far they are unusual, and the extent to which such facts are likely to make fulfilment of the contract by the due date more critical, or to render the plaintiff’s loss heavier in the event of non-fulfilment.”。　　对特殊情况的通知，合理之处就是被告违约方永远可以说是他根本不准备去接受这种特别损失的赔偿风险，如果受害方在订约前告诉他的话。这种没有作出通知或足够通知导致被告成功抗拒赔偿特别损失的先例也不少。针对承运人，分销合约的利润损失不能去索赔的先例有：Wilson v. The Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway (1861) 9 CB (NS) 632；O’ Hanlan v. The Great Western Railway (1865) 12 LT 490；Great Western Railway Co. v. Redmayne (1866) LR 1 CP 329；Horne v. Midland Railway (1873) LR 8 CP 131；The “Arpad” (1934) 49 Lloyd’s Rep 313；Heskell v. Continental Express Ltd. (1950) 83 Lloyd’s Rep 438。针对货物的生产损失或利润不能去索赔的先例有：Hadley v. Baxendale；Gee v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway (1860) 6 H&N 211；British Columbia Saw Mill Co. v. Nettleship (1868) LR 3 CP 499。　　相反，如果是特别情况在订约前通知了被告违约方，而且是在一种情况下被告是接受，或者可以视为接受有关的风险，被告就通常要负责。而这种情况可以是被告漠不关心并去订立合约，即使原告是给了足够与明确的通知。如果被告在通知后试图去在合约增加一条责任限制条文，但最后不成功的情况下订立合约，被告接受有关风险就更明确了。这也是香港高院Reyes大法官的说法，他在2008年2月给香港大学的发言《Certainty in Contractual Damages Assessment – On Two Suggested Alternatives to the Rule in Hadley v. Baxendale》中说道：　　“In other words, the Court should conclude that a promisor undertook liability for an unusual loss if and only if the promisor expressly or impliedly agreed to do so. What has or has not been agreed depends as always on the peculiar facts of a case. But the Court should be able to apply the touchstone in a way that makes the Court’s decisions reasonably foreseeable by all.”　　这两个要求（通知与视为接受）两者都需要，这是Diplock大法官在Robophone Facilities v. Blank (1966) 1 WLR 1428所说。例如在Muhammad v. Ali (1947) AC 414，Trans Trust SPRL v. Danubian Trading Company (1952) 2 QB 297，Wadsworth v. Lydall (1981) 1 WLR 598，这些先例都让原告成功索赔因原告缺钱而导致的损失，因为双方在订合约的时候对原告缺钱的情况是在料想之中。　　3.3& 真正知情可以带来更大或更少的损失　　通常说，违约方在订约时对特别情况知情就要负责赔偿特别损失，都会是指更高的损失。但也有情况会因知情而导致损失的减少，例如在货物买卖中的分销或转售是双方都知情的，而且这是一个赚取很高差价的转售（估计这种情况不常见，因为买方不会希望卖方知道他的分销或转售是赚大钱的，所以不可能去作出特殊情况的通知）。这一来，说法是卖方毁约拒绝供货的赔偿要依据这一个转售，而不是市场价格的差价。在Biggim v. Permanite (1951) 1 KB 422，Devlin大法官是这样说：　　“If, however, a sub-sale is within the contemplation of the parties, I think that the damages must be assessed by reference to it, whether the plaintiff likes it or not…If it is the plaintiff’s liability to the ultimate user that is contemplated as the measure of damages and it is in fact used without injurious results so that no such liability arises, the plaintiff could not claim the difference in market ＆#118alue, and say that the sub-sale must be disregarded.”　　但看来如果是一个双方在订约时都知情与作出过通知的分销或者转售，而且赚取的差价不高或甚至亏本，反正就是比毁约时的市场价格低，看来也应该在计算损失时去考虑在内，这会导致更低的赔偿金额。Pearce勋爵在The “Heron II ” (1967) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 457是这样说：　　“Of course the extension of the horizon need not always it might introduce a knowledge of particular circumstances, e.g. a sub-contract, which show that the plaintiff would in fact suffer less damage than a more limited view of the circumstances might lead one to expect.”　　这种情况也在Duncan Investment Ltd v. Underwood (1998) PNLR 754, CA出现。案情涉及了15栋房屋买卖，其中原告Duncan是地产商，而被告Underwood是估价师。原告想去从接管人的米兰银行把15栋房屋（本来是16栋，但最终有1栋没有成交）以低价一并买下，然后分别出售赚钱。在行动之前，原告委任被告去对这15栋房屋分别出售，估计在6个月内出售可以卖得的价钱。被告作出了估价，但事后才知道被告把价钱估高了。反正是原告在这笔生意上亏了大本，所以去向被告提出索赔，希望把自己的损失减低。针对损失的计算，原告认为是他从米兰银行对15栋房屋的支付价格减去把15栋房屋一并出售的差价，即148,253英镑。但被告认为是原告的支付价格减去把15栋房屋分别出售的差价，即41,190英镑。原因是一并出售与分别出售所得出的价格相差很远，是25%以上。毕竟，去分别出售的话，麻烦会增加不少。原告认为是第一种计算办法比较正确，因为这是苹果对苹果的比较。因为原告的支付价格是一并购买去计算的，所以也应该以一并出售的价格来计算。上诉庭把高院的一审判决推翻，判是应该赔41,190英镑。这是因为被告在订约时并不知道原告从米兰银行购买的价格，他只知道原告将会去把这15栋房屋分别出售。所以，损失计算应该是以违约方在订约时的知情与愿意承担的赔偿责任为准。上诉庭是这样说：“To put it another way, to measure Duncan’s loss by reference to a basis of valuation which was not that on which Underwoods were asked to advise would impose on the ＆#118aluer a liability greater than he could reasonably have thought he was undertaking.”　　看来这表示在一般情况下，在国际货物买卖或其他涉及市场的交易，买方在订约前去通知卖方特殊情况例如分销或转售，不一定是明智之举。因为在毁约时，如果该货物或商品市场价格高涨（这也往往是导致卖方毁约与拒绝供货的诱因），受害方买方根据“breach date rule”，也就是根据违约时市场价格与合约价格的差价，去作出索赔。会遇上毁约方卖方抗拒说应该只能索赔分销合约与原合约价格的差价。这方面也可以去节录Thomas大法官在North Sea Energy Holdings v. Petroleum Authority of Thailand (1997) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 418中的有关判词：　　“If, in this case, MSH (受害方/卖方) could have claimed damages by reference to a market, then whether or not oil could have been delivered under the Magoil offer （供应方） would, in accordance with those authorities, be irrelevant.& But, in this action, MSH base their claim to damages solely by reference to a specific offer which they say would have entitled them to very it must follow that the party in repudiation, PTT（毁约方/买方）, can contend that those profits could never have been earned because that specific offer could never have been performed. The cases upon which MSH rely are not material to the factual issue in this case of the proof of damages by reference to the Magoil contract.”&
4　The “Heron II ”先例的解读　　接下去是贵族院的重要先例The “Heron II ” (1967) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 457。案情又涉及了航运，该船舶从罗马尼亚装了3千吨食糖到伊拉克的巴斯拉港。本来这一个航次所需要的时间只是20天，但由于船舶在中途不合理绕航（去了另一个港口加装其他货物，但没有在租约内说明），导致了10天的延误。如果船舶准时抵达，该批食糖的应得价格是97,000英镑左右。但因为延误，实得的价格只有93,000英镑，两者相差4,000英镑的市场损失。在仲裁中，被认定是船舶不合理绕航。剩下来的争议主要是在损失的计算，也就是违约方船东在订约时是否可以合理预见食糖市场的损失有可能或很有可能。这也被法院认定是船东（即使不是一个食糖的贸易商）一般性应该知道，也就是属于推定知情。其中，Morris勋爵是这样说：　　“The carriage of sugar from the Black Sea to Iraqi ports (including Basrah) is a recognized trade. The appellant knew that there was a sugar market at Basrah.& When he contracted with the respondents to carry their sugar to Basrah, though he did not know what were the actual plans of the respondents, he had all the information to enable him to appreciate that a delay in things result in their suffering some loss.& He must have known that the price in a market may fluctuate.& He must have known that if a price goes down someone whose goods are late in arrival may be caused loss…I think that it must follow that, where there is delay in arrival, in many cases the actual loss suffered (above the amount of which there ought not to be recovery) can be measured by comparing the market price of the goods at the date when they should have arrived and the market price when they did arrive.& Thatprima facie is the measure of the damages.”　　在该先例贵族院对Victoria Laundry先例主要的一个批评就是在第二条损失规定的“合理预见”（reasonably foreseeable），Reid勋爵认为这带来合约与侵权的混淆。因为在侵权下，被告作为一般人是能够合理预见会发生的事十分广泛，包括一些最不寻常的损失类别，除非这种损失风险小到一种可以不去理会的情况：　　“The defendant will be liable for any type of damage which is reasonably foreseeable as liable to happen even in the most unusual case, unless the risk is so small that a reasonable man would in the whole circumstances feel justify in neglecting it.”。　　Reid勋爵认为在Hadley v. Baxendale，可以作为正常损失向违约方索赔取回的损失不是合理预见的测试，而是去看合约并找出双方订约时“可以料想得到”（in the parties’ contemplation）有可能发生的损失类别。他是这样说有关Hadley v. Baxendale：　　“…did not intend that every type of damage which was reasonably foreseeable by the parties when the contract was make should either be considered as arising naturally, i.e. in the usual course of things, or be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties. Indeed the decision makes it clear that a type of damage which was plainly foreseeable as a real possibility but which would only occur in a small minority of cases cannot be regarded as arising in the usual course of things or be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties: the parties are not supposed to contemplate as grounds for the recovery of damage any type of loss or damage which on the knowledge available to the defendant would appear to him as only likely to occur in a small minority of cases.”　　4.1& “合理预见”与“料想得到”的分别　　可以说，在The “Heron II”，贵族院是把Victoria Laundry v. Newman Industries (1949) 2 K.B. 528的“合理预见”（reasonably foreseeable）变了是“料想得到”（within contemplation）。这两个测试中，前者是属于侵权而后者属于合约，正如Upjohn勋爵在The “Heron II”所说：“it is better to use contemplate or contemplation in the case of contract, leaving foresee or foreseeability to the realm of torts”。表面看来，它们有一定的区别。例如，侵权的测试会比较宽，也不会好像合约的测试会有个别案子带来的多样变化，比方是不同的行业就会带来不同的推定知情，双方也可以通过订约前的通知令对方能够对特别损失真正知情。但纯粹是从一般的违约方对某种损失能否合理预见或合理料想得到，这看来是没有什么差别。在Parsons v. Uttley Ingham (1977) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 522，Scarman大法官是这样说：“it may be that the necessary reconciliation is to be found, notwithstanding the strictures of Lord Reid, in holding that the difference between ‘reasonably foreseeable’ (the test in tort) and ‘reasonably contemplated’ (the test in contract) is semantic, not substantial. Certainly, Asquith LJ in Victoria Laundry and Lord Pearce in The ‘Heron II’ thought so, and I confess I think so too.”　　4.2& Hadley v. Baxendale先例的两条规则实是一条规则的说法 　　普通法发展到The “Heron II”的“可以合理料想到”（within reasonable contemplation）某种类的损失“不是不可能”（not unlikely）会因违约而产生，就可以去区分某一种损失的类别是否可以或不可以去向违约方索赔，就开始有了说法是Hadley v. Baxendale的两条规则实质上是一条规则。这可以去节录Goff大法官在The “Pegase” (1981) 1 Lloyd’s Rep 175是这样解释：“The general result of the two cases (Victoria Laundry v. Newman Industries 与 The Heron II) is that the principle in Hadley v Baxendale is now no longer stated in terms of two rules, but rather in terms of a single principle – thought it is recognized that the application of the principle may depend on the degree of relevant knowledge held by the defendant at the time of the contract in the particular case.& This approach accords very much to what actually the Courts have not been over-ready to pigeon-hole the cases under one or other of the so-called rules in Hadley v Baxendale, but rather to decide each case on the basis of the relevant knowledge of the defendant.”　　同一个说法在好几个重要先例都有涉及，例如在Kpohraror v. Woolwich Building Society (1996) 4 ALL ER 116，案情涉及了银行错误地不兑现客户的一张支票，法院判客户的信誉受到损害的损失可以根据Hadley v. Baxendale的第一条损失规定，也就是一般损失成功索赔。但客户生意上的损失就被视为是特别损失，这是被告银行在没有通知下料想不到的。上诉庭的Evans大法官是这样说：“The contentions for both parties were presented as if a straitjacket imposed by the strict application of the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale so as to require the separate consideration of each of the two limbs … I would prefer to hold that the starting point for any application of Hadley v. Baxendale is the extent of the shared knowledge of both parties when the contract was made … When that is established, it may often be the case that the first and second parts of the rule overlap, or at least that it is unnecessary to draw a clear line of demarcation between them.”　　但在《McGregor on Damages》（2003第六版）之202页的注脚50提到这一个问题是学术性的，说：“It can indeed be said to be largely an academic question whether recovery for a contractual loss falls under the first or the second rule in Hadley v. Baxendale …”　　笔者就可以接下去跳到一个最近期的先例，这是在The “Achilleas”（2007）1 Lloyd’s Rep. 19, Christopher Clark大法官也有说Hadley v. Baxendale的两条规则在现代的做法是把它视为一条综合性损失规定 (the modern approach is to treat the rule as a composite whole)，而这个规定是如下：　　“(a)　The mere fact that a type of loss is foreseeable is not, of itself, sufficient to some one may foresee a result that is very remote. （损失类别光是可以预见有可能产生并不足够，有一些人是可以预见很长远的后果。）　　(b)　A claimant is, however, entitled to recover damages in respect of a foreseeable result which either:－ （原告受害方可以索赔损失是能够预见到，并且是）　　（i）　will happen in the gre or （在大部分的情况下会产生）　　（ii）　in respect of which, on the facts known or available to the defendant, the chances of its happening are considerably less than evens but the occurrence of which would not be very unusual.”（在被告违约方所知情或能够知情的事实情况下，会产生的机会是远低于50%，但如果产生的话并非不寻常）　　Christopher Clark大法官看来还是用“合理预见”的测试，但去把合约的合理预见加上了限制，变了与侵权有所分别。例如在不知情的情况下，合理预见必须是在大部分情况会发生或产生的损失类别。　　4.3& 大部分情况下发生的程度是指什么　　能够料想到在大部分情况下会发生的损失是属于Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex. 341先例中第一类的损失，就是在The “Achilleas”（2007）1 Lloyd’s Rep. 19先例中被提到是大部分情况下会发生（will happen in the great majority of cases）。这让笔者注意到机率（odds）这个问题。表面看来，发生机率低的损失不应该是大部分会遇到的情况。但在一些著名的案例中并不是这样说，他们针对的并不是某一个损失的机率高低，而是去看损失的类别（type of loss）是否在某一种违约/毁约情况下是大部分会遇到。这里第一个先例就是The “Heron II” (1969) 1 AC 350，Pearce勋爵举了一个例子说明某种损失类别是属于某种违约很自然会导致的，但机率造成有关的损失不一定是高。他举的例子是针对高院的屋顶维修，但承建商没有把工程做好而构成违约。结果屋顶塌下来，把人压伤。作为损失的类别，可以说是最自然不过，因为屋顶维修有疏忽会塌下来并压伤人是小孩子都知道的。但如果去把高院不上班的时候、周末与假期等都计算进去，就会发觉屋顶在塌下来的时候下面有人被压伤的机率只有十分之一。这就变了去看机率就不是属于多数遇到的情况。Pearce勋爵是这样说：　　“I do not think that Alderson B. (in Hadley v. Baxendale) was directing his mind to whether something resulting in the natural course of events was an odds-on chance or not. A thing may be a natural (or even an obvious) result even though the odds are against it. Suppose a contractor was employed to repair the ceiling of one of the Law Courts and did it so negligently that it collapsed on the heads of those in court. I should be inclined to think that any tribunal (including the learned baron himself) would have found as a fact that the damage arose ‘naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things.’ Yet if one takes into account the nights, weekends, and vacations, when the ceiling might have collapsed, the odds against it collapsing on top of anybody’s head are nearly ten to one. I do not believe that this aspect of the matter was fully considered and worked out in the judgment. He was thinking of causation and type of consequence rather than of odds.”。　　另一个先例是Parson (Livestock) v. Uttley Ingham & Co (1978) QB 791，上诉庭的Scarman大法官说：　　“It does not matter, in my judgment, if (the defendants) thought that the chance of physical injury … was slight, or that the odds were against it, provided they contemplated as a serious possibility the type of consequence, not necessarily the specific consequences, that ensured on breach. Making the assumption as to breach that the judge did, no more than common sense was needed for them to appreciate that food affected by bad storage conditions might well cause illness in the pigs fed upon it.”。&
5　损失类别只要是在双方订约时料想到的范围内，而与损失的严重性无关　　上述所讲的实际会产生损失的机率不在考虑范围，也可以延伸去考虑实际损失的严重性。只要是损失类别是属于某一种违约的大部分情况下会产生，而且在订约时可以合理料想得到，这就已经足够。这方面的权威先例是Parsons v. Uttley Ingham (1977) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 522，案情涉及了原告（养猪场场主）向被告（生产散装饲料储存漏斗的厂家）订造了一个漏斗以储存猪饲料。合约订明漏斗必须配有通风盖。漏斗造成后运到猪场安装时，被告忘了打开漏斗的通风盖。由于该漏斗高达28英尺，从地面根本无法看到通风盖是否开着，后来因为缺乏通风饲料逐渐霉变，而原告还懵然不知继续拿来喂猪，直到一些猪只病了才发现问题。之后发生猪瘟共死了254头猪。该案主要是判被告要否赔偿原告猪只死亡的重大损失。上诉庭判下来认为，被告只要有一般常识就应料想得到储存条件差会造成饲料变质，从而很可能引起吃这些饲料的猪只发病。因此，猪只发病死亡的损失类别是违约的被告可以在订约时合理料想得到的，他必须赔偿这一类损失。另外，Scarman大法官特别指出，只要认定被告订约时应能合理料想得到某类违约会做成某类损失，就可以判令被告负责此类损失的赔偿，而不必再追究此类损失的具体程度如何、是否出于意料之外的严重。比如该案中猪是病了还是死了、死了多少头等，这些都不必深究，反正要全赔。他是这样说：　　“It does not matter, in my judgment, if the defendant thought that the chance of physical injury ... was slight, or that the odds were against it, provided they contemplated as a serious possibility the type of consequence, not necessarily the specific consequence, that ensued on breach. Making the assumption as to breach that the judge did, no more than common sense was needed for them to appreciate that food affected by bad storage conditions might well cause illness in the pigs fed upon it.”。　　该上诉庭判例的总结是说：“The defendant were liable for the illness and death of the pigs and that they ought reasonably to have foreseen that if the hopper, unventilated, was unfit for the storage of pignuts to be fed to the plaintiff’s pigs, there was a serious possibility that the pigs might become ill… The fact that the pigs suffered from E Coli, a far worse illness than could then be foreseen did not lessen the liability since the type or kind of damage was foreseeable even if the extent of it was not.”　　合约是如此，侵权行为亦是如此，只要造成的实际损失是可合理预见的类别，则后果严重程度将不加以理会，正如“egg-shell skull”与“shabby millionaire”都有这种精神在内。&
6　双方在订约时料想到的损失类别可以多于一种　　有些情况下，双方在订约时料想到的损失类别可能会多于一种，在The “Kriti Rex”(1996) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 171先例中，英国法院判船舶如果没有按约定准时到达装港装货，这种违约是可以有两种损失类别的。第一种就是货方另去市场租用一艘替代船舶或以其他船舶付运（比如集装箱货物），多支付的运费就可以向违约的原船东索赔。第二种就是货方由于没有办法作出付运，损失类别就是在卸港这批货物的市场价格（要去扣除付运的费用）。根据哪一种损失类别去向违约船东索赔显然就要看货方在违约后是否能够找到替代船舶付运有关的货物。这有时候会做不到，而做不到的后果对货方的损失显然就是该批货物没有办法付运到卸港，所以真正的损失是这批货物在卸港的市场价格，也就是第二种类别。相反，如果货方在违约后是能够找到替代船舶，但不去这样做，这就涉及了货方没有合理减少损失（mitigate damage）的问题了。反正这种情况下与真正找到替代船舶付运的损失计算都会是第一种的类别。Moore-Bick大法官在The “Kriti Rex”先例是这样说：　　“In my judgment these decisions support Mr. Flaux’s （货方大律师） submission that damages for failure to carry a cargo may be measured either by the difference between market and charter rates of freight or by reference to the ＆#118alue of the goods at the port of discharge (with appropriate deductions). Both measures of damage must be taken to have been within the contemplation of the parties because they are different ways of measuring the loss which the charterer suffers by not having his goods carried to the contractual destination. Which will be the appropriate measure in any given case will not doubt depend on the circumstances of the case, given that the plaintiff is under a duty to act reasonably to mitigate his loss. I do not consider that the passages in Scrutton and Voyage Charters to which I was referred are inconsistent with this view. They simply reflect the fact that in many cases alternative shipping space will be available, and if it is, it will probably be incumbent on the charterer to mitigate his loss by making use of it. I do not accept, therefore, that the charterer must be able to show that alternative space was not available before he can recover damages measured by reference to the ＆#118alue of the goods at the port of discharge, as Mr. Young （船方大律师） submitted. That does not, however, prevent the ship owner from seeking to establish that the charterer failed to act properly in mitigation, and I shall come to consider this aspect of the matter a little later.”　　顺便简单介绍一下这个案例的案情，涉及的是一艘冷藏船“Kriti Rex”轮被租用在南美洲的Manzanillo、Santo Tomas与Big Creek 这几个港口装香蕉，目的地是英国的Portsmouth比利时的Zeebrugge。当船舶在Manzanillo装上16,530箱香蕉并开向Santo Tomas时，中途发生机器故障，并且后来被法院认定是船舶不适航（因为主机的润滑油系统不清洁）。在Santo Tomas的香蕉已经被割下待装，但由于“Kriti Rex”轮无法准时到达，货方就想办法另找替代船舶，但找不到。最后的处置办法是通过与另一家美国的著名公司Del Monte的协议将该批香蕉卖到美国的Galveston。至于在“Kriti Rex”轮上的16,530箱香蕉，也因为船舶修理的延误而无法在腐烂前运至目的地，而在南美洲也无市场出售。结果货方把该批香蕉捐赠给洪都拉斯红十字会。事后货方向船方提出索赔，损失就是：（1）在Santo Tomas与Big Creek待装的香蕉在欧洲两个目的地的价值，减掉付运的费用与卖给Del Monte的那部分香蕉的价值；（2）在Manzanillo装上的16,530箱香蕉的全损。货方与船方主要的争议之一是损失（1）应否是替代船舶去欧洲的运费差价，这显然比货方要求的在欧洲两个目的地的价值要低得多。正如较早的解释，到底以哪一种损失类别为准，关键是去看货方有无办法合理找到替代船舶将该批香蕉运至目的地。　　6.1　实质损失和经济损失的分别　　法律针对“实质的损失和伤亡”（physical injury and damage）与“经济损失”（economic loss）例如利润损失，看来是有所分别，虽然这两类损失都是在订约时可以料想得到如果违约有可能会产生的损失。在先例Parsons v. Uttley Ingham (1977) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 522中，Denning勋爵明确地把它们作出了区分，认为针对前者，违约方在订约时只要料想得到有一个轻微的可能性就已经足够要去负责，而且后果严重与否不加以考虑。但针对后者，就需要在订约时有一个重大的可能性才需要负责。他是这样说：　　“In the … loss of profit cases – the defaulting party is only liable for the consequences if they are such as, at the time of the contract he ought reasonably to have contemplated as a serious possibility or real danger … In the … physical injury or expense case – the defaulting party is liable for any damage which he ought reasonably to have foreseen at the time of the breach as a possible consequence, even if it was only a slight possibility …”　　Scarman大法官也同意Denning勋爵的意见，并提出经济损失只涉及违约/毁约，而合约则有充分的订约自由，说：　　“I agree with Lord Denning, M.R., in thinking it absurd that the test for remoteness of damage should, in principle, differ according to the legal classification of the cause of action – though one must recognise that parties to a contract have the right to agree on a measure of damages which may be greater or less, than the law would offer in the absence of agreement …”　　针对实质的损失和伤亡，可去节录《McGregor on Damages》（第十七版）一书之6-157段所说有关不理会实际损失的严重程度，如下：　　“It is submitted that, in contract as in tort, it should suffice that, if physical injury or damage is within the contemplation of the parties, recovery is not to be limited because the degree of physical injury or damage could not have been anticipated.”　　但涉及经济损失（例如受害方的利润损失），即使损失类别是在订约双方料想得到的范围内，也有不同的对待。例如在Victoria Laundry v. Newman (1949) 2 KB 528，一般性的利润损失就可以去成功索赔，但利润很高的就被视为是特别损失。显然，实际损失的程度严重与否是有区分的。所以在Brown v. K.M.R. Services (1995) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 513，上诉庭的Stuart Smith大法官是这样说：“I do not see any difficulty in holding that loss of ordinary business profits are different in kind from those flowing from a particular contract which gives rise to very high profits, the existence of which is unknown to the other party and who therefore does not accept the risk of such loss occurring.”　　在另一个先例North Sea Energy Holdings v. Petroleum Authority of Thailand (1997) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 418，案情涉及石油的买卖，卖家有很大的利润损失，但是无法向违约的买家成功索赔。一个原因是因为买家在订约时根本不可能知道这票石油是卖家以低于合约价格非常多的价格从另外的供应商买得，而这一买一卖的价格差本会为卖家带来极大的利润。　　至于实质损失与经济损失为什么有这样的差异，前者比较宽松的一个原因会是实质损失通常被视为是毁约所造成的直接后果（direct consequence）。另一个原因是Denning勋爵在Parsons v. Uttley Ingham所说的在该先例的同类情况下，受害方会有可能直接去向供应商根据产品责任去提出索赔，这就, 涉及了侵权行为。所以，针对合理预见，合约与侵权针对这种实质损失就应该是一致，比较宽松。这在实际伤亡也是一样，受害方可以直接根据侵权向责任方去提出索赔。　　至于经济损失（例如是利润损失）比较严格对待，正如Brown v. K.M.R. Services先例所说，正常的业务所带来的利润是与一些特殊合约带来的极高利润被视为两类不同的损失类别。同样的说法也在近期的Mayhaven Healthcare Ltd v. Bothma (2009) EWHC 2634 (TCC)先例出现。这等于是实际损失的程度严重与否是会带来区分。毕竟，违约方如果担心要负责极高利润的损失，由于有订约自由，他可以在订约时以合约条文（如免责条文或责任限制条文）去减少损失。&
7　The “Achilleas”先例对损失规定带来的不明朗　　在这个贵族院的重要海事先例The “Achilleas” (2009) 1 AC 61 (HL)，涉及了损失的遥远性问题，并且带来了一些不明朗，即是否对Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex. 341有所改变。去详细讨论之前，不妨先介绍有关的案情。　　7.1& 案情介绍　　这可去节录杨大明律师所著的《期租合约》之125页，如下： 　　“首先笔者去介绍该案例的有关事实。它是一个5-7个月的期租，并后来去再续期5-7个月，租金是每天16,750美元。反正，可计算出来的还船最后日子（terminal redelivery date）是日。在这一天之前之4月20日，承租人给了还船通知说是在4月30日至5月2日之间。这一来，船东就去在市场订下下一个4-6个月的期租，租金是每天39,500美元，而销约期是5月8日。可以说如果承租人能准时在5月2日还船，赶得及下一个租约的销约期可以说是绰绰有余。但最终船舶是在5月11日才在日本的大分港（Oita）卸清了煤炭并去还船给船东。这一来超出或延迟的时间是9天，与市场租金的差价去比较损失应是158,301.17美元。但实际上船东的损失远不止此数，这是因为延迟至5月11日还船就错过了下一个租约的5月8日销约期，而当时市场租金急剧下挫，这导致了船东最终被下一个租约承租人压价才保住了这份租约。这压的价是从原先订下的39,500美元变为31,500美元，等于每天损失8,000美元。这去乘以至少4个月的租约期，船东真正的损失就变成了1,364,584.37美元。 　　在伦敦仲裁，多数的两位仲裁员认为承租人应该赔偿船东真正的损失。但另一位不同意见的著名仲裁员认为针对这个问题的先例一直很稳定，只去赔偿船东租约租金与市场租金的差价，不应去轻易改动，令人无所适从。他也在后来私下通知说他不相信该船东在下一个租约被压价是真实的， 所以主要因为这个原因而持不同意见。这一个仲裁被败诉的承租人（香港的Transfield Shipping Inc）上诉去法院，但被驳回，Clarke大法官认为承租人在订约时应该可以合理预见这一个类别的损失并非是不太可能（not unlikely）会产生，即使这种情况会发生的机率是低于50%，这也是去支持多数仲裁员所裁决的说法，就是这种损失可以在今天航运市场在订约时可以预见到。 　　这一来， 何谓遥远的损失 (remoteness) 被扩大不少， 特别是针对大家是在同一行业的合同双方， 都被视为在订约时应该能够预见在该行业的一般做法与市场变化。& 仍会被视为是不可预见的遥远损失看来只会局限在只有索赔方自己才能知道的一些特殊、 不平常与奇怪的方面所带来的损失， 这种损失只能在订约时通知了对方才能去成功索赔，但它不会是太多。反正是，在著名的Hadley v. Baxendale先例中所作出的两个分支，即一般损失与特别损失，后者是要在订约前通知对方才能成功索赔，两者看来已经是没有什么区分了。” 　　杨大明律师的《期租合约》一书因出版时间较早，没有去针对贵族院最后对The“Achilleas”的判例。但可以说，多数仲裁员的裁决以及高院与上诉庭都认为船东这一种损失的类别是属于Hadley v. Baxendale中第一类别的一般损失（ordinary damages），所以是可以向违约（延误还船）的承租人索赔。至于实际损失是严重或是不严重，已经在先例Parsons v. Uttley Ingham (1977) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 522介绍过这是不受影响的。但笔者是倾向同一这个少数仲裁员的不同意见，因为知道这样判法的危险性。原因是在期租合约，会导致延误还船的情况比比皆是。例如在卸港遇上坏天气就会拖延卸货时间几天，卸港拥挤又会延误靠泊几天，领港或拖轮罢工又会延误进港或开航几天，这种例子多不胜数，导致承租人在一个航次期租（time charter trip）或者一个期租最后的航次中根本没有办法掌握准确的还船时间。在航运市场上涨的时候，本来只去支付延误还船那几天的差价是一直以来承租人可以接受的。但如果现在要面对船东可能因为延误还船而错过了下一个租约的消约期所带来的所有损失就很难接受了。而且笔者也担心一些精明的船东很容易作假，就是把船舶的下一航次租给自己联营公司（但表面看不出来，因为是一家巴拿马或利比里亚公司，要查他的底细也无从去查）。而租约是10年，租金订得很高，而消约期是只要原来的租约延误还船1、2天就会错过。这岂非是让船东在延误还船1、2天就可以向承租人索赔（或敲诈）一两千万美元不等金额的庞大损失？话总是有的说，精明的承租人可以通过订约自由在他的期租合约内去规定如果发生延误还船只要赔偿的只是超出时间的租金差价。但总会有承租人会上当，而法律默示地位能够做到还是最好是公平合理与实践。　　7.2　贵族院的“客观去看订约双方是否愿意承担赔偿的责任”的测试　　 　　幸亏The “Achilleas”在贵族院被改变过来，判承租人所需要赔偿的金额只是延迟的9天，与市场租金的差价去比较，也就是158,301.17美元。但贵族院主要的判决原因是由Hoffmann勋爵作出，大致上是说，赔偿是要根据合约中双方所自愿去承担的损失。而在该先例，客观去看承租人在有关的租约下应该只愿意去承担9天的差价，而不是下一个租约所有的损失。Hoffmann勋爵是这样说：　　“The findings of the majority arbitrators shows that they considered their decision to be contrary to what would have been the expectations of the parties, but dictated by the rules in Hadley v Baxendale as explained in The Heron II (1969) 1 AC 350. But in my opinion these rules a they are intended to give effect to the presumed intentions of the parties and not to contradict them.　　The owners submit that the question of whether the damage is too remote is a question of fact on which the arbitrators have found in their favour. It is true that the question of whether the damage was foreseeable is a question of fact: see Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v. Karlshamns Oljefabriker (A/B) (1949) AC 196. But the question of whether a given type of loss is one for which a party assumed contractual responsibility involves the interpretation, is a question of law.（船东说损失是否太遥远是一项事实的认定，而多数仲裁员已经判船东胜诉，这表示法院不应该再去干预事实的认定。但Hoffmann勋爵说虽然损失的在订约时可否预见或料想得到是事实问题，但某一类的损失是否是违约方愿意承担合约责任就涉及了解释合约，这是法律问题。）　　…In my opinion, the findings of the arbitrators and the commercial background to the agreement are sufficient to make it clear that the charterer cannot reasonably be regarded as having assumed the risk of the owner’s loss of profit on the following charter. I would therefore allow the appeal.（在Hoffmann勋爵看来，仲裁庭的事实认定加上商业背景显示了被告承租人不能被合理认为是愿意在租约中承担下一个租约中船东所损失的的所有利润。）”　　贵族院多数的上述意见是支持“客观去看订约双方是否愿意承担赔偿的责任”（objective assessment in the voluntary assumption of responsibility）的测试，带来了不稳定与是否有去改变了Hadley v. Baxendale与Victoria Laundry这两个一脉相承的重要先例带来的大原则，就是只去区分一般损失与特别损失或是去找出违约方在订约时是否可以合理料想得到有可能会产生损失的类别。这一个新的说法也被称为是“以合约为中心去寻找遥远性”（agreement-centred approach to remoteness），而不把损失遥远性当做是合约外的赔偿原则。这会带来要去进一步考虑双方在合约中所愿意承担赔偿的责任就会带来额外争议，因为在每一个不同的合约针对双方愿意承担什么赔偿责任都会涉及谈判过程和合约的解释，这包括了更多事实的认定（finding of facts）和法律的确定（holding of law），这会在针对损失遥远的诉讼变了是更昂贵。由于许多的合约谈判都不会明示针对损失赔偿的遥远性问题（除了赔偿责任限制条文），就表示法院往往在个别案子要去找出双方的默示，例如合约价格比市场价格更高或更低，是否代表了合约一方愿意或不愿意承担更大的赔偿责任。显然这些很不可靠与不稳定，所以有说法是以合约去寻找遥远性是不可行的。例如，在《Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly》季刊（2010年2月）中，在《Contractual interpretation and remoteness》一文中，有说：　　“A strong form of the agreement-centred approach to remoteness that seeks to resolve all questions of risk allocation solely on the basis of the parties’ intentions and agreement as evidenced in the circumstances seems unworkable. Where an intention or agreement as to the allocation of a particular risk simply cannot be discerned, as seems not unlikely in the remoteness context, such an approach will not only be fictional, but will also involve the courts in rewriting the parties’ bargain.”　　这方面可以以一个上诉庭先例去进一步解释，该案例名为Brown v KMR Service Ltd (1995) 4 All ER 598。案情有关劳合社的一位成员向他的劳合社代理人以合约与侵权提出索赔，之后该代理人没有去他提出有关参与承}